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Von Feldt: A Survey Of Recent Developments In The Law: Business Organization

VI. BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS

A.

Direct v. Derivative: What is the ProperTest ?
In Wessin v. Archives Corp.,' the Minnesota Court of Appeal at-

tempted to clarify the proper analysis used in distinguishing between direct and derivative claims. 2 This action presented an opportunity for the judiciary to resolve ambiguity in the test used to
determine whether a shareholder suffered a direct injury distinct
from the corporation. A review of the appellate court decisions illustrates the importance of such clarification.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals found that the proper inquiry was whether the shareholder had suffered a direct injury distinct from the corporation. The need for clarification arose from
language in other Minnesota Supreme Court cases indicating that
the relevant inquiry in determining whether a claim belongs to the
corporation rather than its shareholders is whether the injury to
each shareholder is of the "same character." 4 Additionally, the
court found that the derivative pleading requirements 5 are not
triggered where an action involves both direct and derivative
6
claims. The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed and concluded
that such combination claims must indeed adhere to derivative
pleading requirements
The supreme court failed, however, to
recognize the unique nature of the closely held corporation.
Archives Corporation ("Archives") is a closely held Minnesota

1. 581 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998), rev'd and remanded, 592 N.W.2d
460 (Minn. 1999).
2. 581 N.W.2d at 381-82.
3. See id. at 384.
4. Seitz v. Michel, 148 Minn. 80, 87-88, 181 N.W. 102, 105 (1921) ("Seitz ").
There is also a second Seitz case, Seitz v. Michel, 148 Minn. 474, 181 N.W. 106
(1921) ("Seitz IF).
5. See MIrNN. R. CIv. P. 23.06; see also infra note 41.
6. See Wessin, 581 N.W.2d at 390-91 ("The language of the rule, the legislative and common law history, and the need for coherent litigation procedures persuade us that derivative pleading requirements should not apply to actions that
combine direct and derivative claims.").
7. See Wessin v. Archives Corp., 592 N.W.2d 460, 462 (Minn. 1999).
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corporation dealing in document storage and retrieval." The minority shareholders alleged that John Jerome ('Jerome"), the company's president, chief executive officer, and majority shareholder
committed the following acts: (1) he failed to comply with certain
loan agreements limiting his compensation; (2) he failed to complete an accurate accounting of the company's net profits for 19891992; and (3) he attempted to avoid the company's income limitations by paying his wife a salary.1° In addition, the shareholders alleged self-dealing in that Jerome compensated himself and his wife
through constructive dividends not paid to other corporate shareholders." Finally, the shareholders alleged a series of misrepresentations by Jerome regarding his compensation,
dividend payments,
12
Archives.
of
status
financial
the
and
Two minority shareholders settled their claims and sold their
shares back to Archives.' 3 When negotiations with the two remain-4
ing shareholders failed, they brought suit against the majority.
The district court ruled in favor of the defendants, finding that the
minority shareholders incorrectly pled derivative claims as direct
injuries. 5 On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded, finding that the district court's summary of the case law
demonstrated a variance in the standard for determining whether
16
an action is direct or derivative.
The court began its analysis by noting that "[r] ecent decisions
by Minnesota courts and federal courts interpreting Minnesota law
distinguish between direct and derivative claims by focusing on
whether the shareholder's injury is 'of the same character' as that
of other shareholders. " 1 This "same character" language first ap-

8. See Wessin, 581 N.W.2d at 382.
9. See id. Jerome owned 52% of the company's stock. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 383.
17. Id. As an example, the court cited Northwest Racquet Swim & Health Clubs,
Inc. v. Deloitte & Touche, 535 N.W.2d 612 (Minn. 1995). See Wessin, 581 N.W.2d at
383. In Norwest Racquet, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that in distinguishing between direct and derivative claims, courts must "consider whether the injury
to the individual plaintiff is separate and distinct from the injury to other persons
in a similar situation as the plaintiff." Northwest Racquet, 535 N.W.2d at 617 (citations omitted).
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peared in Seitz v. Michel ("Seitz I").18 Seitz Iinvolved a claim for waste
of corporate assets.' 9 A key issue in Seitz I was whether that type of
claim belonged to the corporation or to the shareholders. In determining the specific fact question in that case, the Minnesota Supreme Court employed the "same character" test.2' However, the
court of appeals in Wessin stated that this test was only to be applied
in that narrow fact situation, not with regard to determination of
direct or derivative claims in general.2 Moreover, the court of appeals noted that Seitz I was decided in 1921, sixty years before the
25
enactment of Minnesota's existing Business Corporations Act.
This act was meant to protect against the type of abuses seen in the
Seitz cases.24 Thus, according to the court of appeals, it is uncertain
whether the "same character" language is applicable anymore,
even
25
given the correct interpretation of the Seitz Icourt's intent.
After distinguishing Seitz Iand acknowledging the origin of the
faulty determination of when a claim is direct or derivative, the
court of appeals turned to the correct test. The court found that
the correct test in determining whether an action is direct or de-

18. 148 Minn. 80, 87-88, 181 N.W. 102, 105 (1921) (Seitz 1).
19. See id. at 83, 181 N.W. at 103.
20. See id. at 87, 181 N.W. at 105.
21. See id.
22. See Wessin, 581 N.W.2d at 384. Specifically, the court noted that "[the
'same character' language is not the test for distinguishing direct claims from derivative claims. It is merely the court's description of the derivative injury at issue."
Id. The Wessin court then quoted the following passage from Seitz I, which supports this reading:
Money which might have been distributed among them as dividends has
been wasted. The value of all stock has been diminished. The injury to
each stockholder is of the same character. Whether the guilty officers
were animated by hostility towards a particular stockholder or by greed,
or were merely improvident, the result is the same and affects all the
stockholders alike.
Id. (quoting Seitz, 148 Minn. at 87-88, 181 N.W. at 105). Of course this reading of
the Seitz I court's use of the "same character" language is not consistent with their
explicit language. The Minnesota Supreme Court in Seitz I stated that in determining whether a claim belongs to the corporation rather than to its shareholders,
the relevant inquiry is "whether the injury to each stockholder is of the same character." Seitz, 148 Minn. at 87-88, 181 N.W. at 105.
23. See Wessin, 581 N.W.2d at 384.
24. See id.
25. See id. The court of appeals specifically stated that "[e ] ven when the language of Seitz Iand Seitz II is correctly cited, its strict applicability is questionable."
Id.
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rivative is whether the shareholder has suffered an injury that is distinct from the corporation.2 6 If they have, the action is direct. 27 If
not, the claim belongs to the corporation. 8 According to the Wessin court, this standard corresponds with the modern trend requiring the plaintiff to be injured directly, or independently from the
corporation, in order to form the basis for a direct action. 29 This is
an emerging trend in Minnesota case law.3 ° The court of appeals
noted, however, that other jurisdictions have recognized that the
test for determining whether an action is direct or derivative is
whether the shareholder has suffered an injury that is distinct from
the corporation."
The court of appeals next turned to specific guidelines to aid
32
in the determination of when a claim is direct or derivative. The
court first advised other courts to examine the nature of the shareholder's claim and the relief that could result from the action by
looking at the body of the plaintiffs complaint rather than the
plaintiff's actual intention or designation.33 Next, the court listed

26. See id. The court also noted that language in certain Minnesota cases focusing on "a direct injury to the shareholder that is distinct from the injury to the
corporation is more consistent with the policies underlying the direct-derivative
distinction." Id. Specifically, the Wessin court was referring to language in Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), outlining that "[a] shareholder may bring a direct action when the shareholder alleges a direct injury to
the shareholder that is separate and distinct from the injury to the corporation."
Id. (quoting Skoglund, 541 N.W.2d at 21).
27.

See id.

28.

See id.

29. See id. at 384.
30. See id. The court found several cases in Minnesota supporting this position. See Wenzel v. Mathies, 592 N.W.2d 634, 641 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (finding
that a derivative action is required when a shareholder suffers harm "that is indis-

tinct from the other shareholders or by the corporation itself"); International
Broad. Corp. v. Turner, 734 F. Supp. 383, 392 (D. Minn. 1990) (recognizing that
the test for a direct injury is whether claimant's injury is distinct from the corporation, but characterizing shareholders' claims for breach of fiduciary duty as derivative because the alleged injury was not "separate and distinct from all shareholders").
31.
See Wessin, 581 N.W.2d at 385. The court of appeals specifically cited to
both Delaware and Georgia cases. See id. (citing Kramer v. Western Pac. Indus.,
Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del. 1988) (finding that the proper test for determining if
an action is direct is whether the shareholder has suffered an injury that is distinct
from the corporation); Grace Bros., Ltd. v. Farley Indus., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 814, 816
(Ga. 1994) (noting that the injury distinct from the corporation standard "is generally recognized as the test that distinguishes derivative from direct claims")).
32. See Wessin, 581 N.W.2d at 385.
33. See id.
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five factors to consider: 34 (1) whether the injury results from the
plaintiff's other relationships with the corporation, such as the
plaintiff's role as an intended beneficiary of a contract; 5 (2)
whether the alleged misconduct was specifically targeted toward
36
the plaintiff shareholder; (3) whether the controlling stockholders engaged in self-dealing that causes a "singular economic injury"
to minority interests alone; 37 (4) whether the defendants' alleged
S • 38
misconduct violates fiduciary duties owed directly to the plaintiffs;

or (5) whether
the plaintiff is seeking only injunctive or prospective
9
relief3
Applying these factors and refocusing the analysis on whether
the injury is independent or distinct from the corporation, the
court found that several of the plaintiff's claims were direct. 4°
However, since the plaintiffs in Wessin brought both direct and derivative claims, the court of appeals was next required to determine
which claims were subject to the derivative pleading requirements
and which were not.4 ' The plaintiffs argued that the court should

recognize an exception from derivative pleading rules for claims
34. See id.
35. See Arent v. Distribution Sciences, Inc., 975 F.2d 1370, 1373 n.2 (8th Cir.
1992) (noting that "[i]ndividual recovery is warranted only if there is a direct injury to the shareholder").
36. See Northwest Racquet Swim & Health Clubs, Inc. v. Deloitte & Touche,
535 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Minn. 1995) (finding that defendant may have committed
"very specific incidences of misrepresentation").
37. Grace Bros., Ltd. v. Farley Indus., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 814, 816 (Ga. 1994).
38. See Lee v. Mitchell, 953 P.2d 414, 423-25 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
39. SeeGrimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1213 (Del. 1996).
40. See Wessin v. Archives Corp., 581 N.W.2d 380, 385 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998),
rev'd and remanded, 592 N.W.2d 460 (Minn. 1999). The court found that at least
three of the plaintiffs claims were direct: (1) fraud and misrepresentation; (2)
breach of fiduciary duty; and (3) unfair prejudice. See id.
41. See id. at 386. The derivative pleading requirements are found in Rule
23.06 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members
to enforce a right of a corporation .... the corporation... having failed
to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint
shall allege that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of
the transaction of which the plaintiff complains or that the plaintiffs
share or membership thereafter devolved on the plaintiff by operation of
law .... The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that
the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interest of the
shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the
corporation or association ....
MINN. R. Civ. P. 23.06.
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brought under Minnesota Statutes section 302A.751, subdivision
1 (b) by minority shareholders in closely held corporations. 3 The
majority shareholder in Wessin argued, however, that in PJAcquisition Corp. v. Skoglundl the Minnesota Supreme Court had already
considered and rejected this contention. In response to this contention, the court of appeals found that since the majority opinion
in Skoglund did not address the exact issue before them, they were
free to formulate their own analysis. 46 The court of appeals saw as
the exact issue before them, "whether a shareholder in a closely
held corporation who alleges both direct and derivative claims
47
must comply with the derivative action pleading requirements."
In answering this question, the court looked to both the legislative history of section 751 and to case law distinguishing between
42. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 1(b) (1998).
302A.751, subd. 1 (b) provides:

Minnesota Statutes section

Subdivision 1. When permitted. A court may grant any equitable relief it
deems just and reasonable in the circumstances or may dissolve a corporation and liquidate its assets and business:
In an action by a shareholder when it is established that:
the directors or the persons having the authority otherwise vested in the
board are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs and
the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock;
the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted fraudulently or illegally toward one or more shareholders in their capacities as
shareholders or directors, or as officers or employees of a closely held
corporation;
the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted in a manner unfairly prejudicial toward one or more shareholders in their capacities as shareholders or directors of a corporation that is not a publicly
held corporation, or as officers or employees of a closely held corporation;
the shareholders of the corporation are so divided in voting power that,
for a period that includes the time when two consecutive regular meetings were held, they have failed to elect successors to directors whose
terms have expired or would have expired upon the election and qualification of their successors;
the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted; or
the period of duration as provided in the articles has expired and has not
been extended as provided in section 302A.801.
MINN.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

§ 302A.751, subd. 1 (b).
See Wessin, 581 N.W.2d at 386.
453 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1990).
Wessin, 581 N.W.2d at 386.
See id.
Id.

STAT.
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large jublicly held corporations and small closely held corporations. The court found that there has always been a significant
difference in the way closely held corporations are treated.4 9 Specifically, the Minnesota Supreme Court has described a closely held
corporation as a "partnership in corporate guise." 50 For this reason,
Minnesota has recognized that a fiduciary relationship
exists
S 51
among the shareholders in a closely held corporation. This type
of relationship is much different than those which exist in a large,
publicly held corporation, and for this reason the court of appeals
found that closely held corporations should not be subject to the
same derivative pleading requirements as large corporations. Finally, the court noted that this approach was consistent not only
with Minnesota precedent, but also was an emerging trend in sev5
eral other jurisdictions.
48. See id. at 386-89.
49. See id. at 388-89.
50. Id. at 388 (quoting Westland Capital Corp. v. Lucht Eng'g, Inc., 308
N.W.2d 709, 712 (Minn. 1981)).
51. See id. (citing Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775, 779 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)).
"This fiduciary relationship imposes the highest duties of honesty, integrity, and
good faith." Id. (citing Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798, 801 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992)). It is also of some importance that the Minnesota legislature added a new
subdivision to Minnesota Statutes section 302A.751 in 1983, which provides that in
determining whether to order equitable relief, dissolution, or buyout, a court must
consider "'the duty which all shareholders in a closely held corporation owe one
another to act in an honest, fair and reasonable manner.'" Id. (quoting MINN.
STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 3(a) (1984)).
52. See id. at 389. Specifically, the court used the following analysis:
Although the derivative pleading requirements are critical to the successful operation of large publicly held corporations, they are not consistent
with the manner in which the Minnesota legislature or the courts treat
closely held corporations. Requiring minority shareholders in closely
held Minnesota corporations to follow the derivative pleading requirements... when bringing actions under Minn. Stat. §302A.751, subd.1 (b),
appears inconsistent with its fundamental legislative intent and purpose.
A derivative pleading requirement would substantially restrict the availability of Minn. Stat. §302A.751, subd.1. This restriction would thwart the
legislative purpose of section 302A.751, subd.1, which was expressly enacted to protect minority shareholders in closely held corporations.
Id.
53. See id. This emerging trend was seen in many jurisdictions. See Watson v.
Button, 235 F.2d 235, 237 (9th Cir. 1956) (permitting individual shareholder to
recover for misappropriation of corporate assets by a director "where the rights of
creditors and other shareholders are not prejudiced"); Orsi v. Sunshine Art Studios, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 471, 474-75 (D. Mass. 1995) (allowing minority shareholder
to bring direct action against close family corporation); Johnson v. Gilbert, 621
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As an alternative basis for its conclusion that the derivative
pleading requirements should not apply to actions involving direct
and derivative claims, the court of appeals looked to the language
of the civil procedure derivative pleading rule. 4 Because the derivative pleading rule refers to derivative actions, not derivative
claims, "[a] n action that involves both direct claims and derivative
claims would, strictly speaking, not be a derivative action."5 5 The
court admitted that this was a "constrained reading" of the rule, but
still saw their approach as consistent with the history and treatment
of closely held corporations and emerging case law.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals' decision in Wessin highlights
several possible interpretations with regard to the derivative pleading requirements for shareholders in close corporations. 57 The first
interpretation is that minority shareholders in a closely held corporation never have to adhere to the derivative pleading requirements. Although this conclusion is inconsistent with the court's
ultimate holding,5 9 its long discussion of the differences between
closely held corporations and publicly held corporations indicates a
preference for this approach by the court.60
A second interpretation is that the derivative pleading requirements should apply where there are a greater number of direct claims than derivative claims. This approach is not considered
by the court of appeals, but would be more consistent with the requirements of rule 26.03, while still recognizing a difference in
P.2d 916, 918 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (permitting direct action against closely held
corporation involving plaintiffs and defendants who "operated more as partners
than in strict compliance with the corporate form").
54. See Wessin, 581 N.W.2d at 390.
55. Id.
56. Id. The court in Wessin noted an explicit example in Warthan v. Midwest
ConsolidatedInsuranceAgencies, Inc., 450 N.W.2d 145, 148-49 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
See Wessin, 581 N.W.2d at 390. According to the Wessin court, the Minnesota Court
of Appeals in Warthan "allowed minority shareholders to bring a direct suit for an
arguably derivative claim.... " Id. (citing Warthan, 450 N.W.2d at 148-49).
57. See id. at 386-89.
58. See id. at 389.
59. See id. at 390. The court concludes their opinion by noting that "[t]he
language of the rule, the legislative and common law history, and the need for coherent litigation procedures persuade us that derivative pleading requirements
should not apply to actions that combine direct and derivative claims." Id. at 39091.
60. See id. at 387-89. The court notes that "[a]lthough the derivative pleading
requirements are critical to the successful operation of large publicly held corporations, they are not consistent with the manner in which the Minnesota legislature or the courts treat closely held corporations." Id. at 389.
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treatment between closely held corporations and large publicly
held corporations.
A third interpretation is that minority shareholders must comply with the derivative pleading requirements if any part of their
cause of action is derivative. This approach is clearly not favored by
the Wessin court, ' but absent legislative action on the subject, this
might be the most technically correct attempt at conforming to
rule 26.03.62

Fourth and finally, the derivative pleading requirements may
read as inapplicable to actions that combine direct and derivative
claims. This interpretation of rule 26.03 is the favored approach by
the court of appeals and clearly states their holding.63 This last interpretation was not, however, accepted by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in their review of the Wessin case. 64 The supreme court
found that actions that combine direct and derivative claims must
still adhere to the derivative pleading requirements. 65 The supreme
court's reasoning for this position stems from their belief that the
court of appeals' interpretation would effectively eliminate the derivative pleading requirements. 66
For example, under the court of appeals interpretation, 6' a
plaintiff-shareholder could merely plead one direct claim along
with a derivative claim, and effectively defeat the derivative pleading requirements. However, the supreme court's view of the derivative pleading requirements seems to lose sight of the need to
treat closely held corporations differently than their large, publicly
held c6unterparts. After all, there is always the possibility that a derivative action will be futile because it returns the recovery to the
corporation, which is still under the control of the majorityshareholder wrongdoer. The supreme court dealt with this possibility by highlighting the need for a unified standard for all corpo-

61. See id. at 389-91.
62. However, this approach presupposes that the Minnesota Court of Appeals' reading of rule 26.03 is incorrect. In the court's view, the rule speaks in
terms of actions, not claims, and "[a] n action that involves both direct claims and
derivative claims would, strictly speaking, not be a derivative action." Id. at 390.
63. See id. at 391.
64. See Wessin v. Archives Corp., 592 N.W.2d 460, 466 (Minn. 1999).
65. See id.
66. See id. at 467.
67. See Wessin v. Archives Corp., 581 N.W.2d 380, 385-86 (Minn. Ct. App.

1998).
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rations.6 The supreme court noted that a closely held corporation
is still "a corporation with all the rights and limitations proscribed
by the legislature." 69 As the Seventh Circuit noted, and the Minnesota Supreme Court agreed:
Corporations are not partnerships. Whether to incorporate
entails a choice of many formalities. Commercial rules should
be predictable; this objective is best served by treating
corporations as what they are, allowing the investors and other
participants to vary the rules by contract if they think
deviations are warranted ....
"[T] he closely held nature of the
corporation [is] irrelevant
to
the distinction between direct
70
and derivative actions."
The Wessin case is important because it demonstrates an ambiguity in the derivative pleading requirements and illustrates the difficulties inherent in treating closely held coiTorations differently
than their large, publicly held counterparts.
This ambiguity is
highlighted by the fact that the Minnesota Court of Appeals and
the Minnesota Supreme Court came to two different conclusions
on ostensibly the same issue. Additionally, the court of appeals'
clarification of the proper test for determining whether an action is
direct or derivative 7 serves as an excellent guide to practitioners
dealing in corporate law.
B.

Minority ShareholderBuyouts

In McCallum v. Rosen's Diversified, Inc.,73 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a terminated chief executive
officer ("CEO"), a minority shareholder of a closely held Minnesota corporation, was entitled to a court ordered buyout of his
shares.7 4 In reaching this decision, the Eighth Circuit noted that
Minnesota law does not specifically outline when a court ordered

68. See Wessin, 592 N.W.2d at 466.
69. Id.
70. Id. (quoting Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379, 384
(7th Cir. 1990)).
71. See id. at 389.
72. See id. at 384-86.
73. 153 F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 1998).
74. See id. at 704.
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buyout is appropriate.75 Thus, the Eighth Circuit's role was to determine what the Minnesota Supreme Court would likely hold were
it to decide the issue.16 In the Eighth Circuit's view, the termination of a CEO, together with an offer to redeem the CEO's stock,
was sufficient to warrant a judicially ordered buyout. 77 The main
consequence of this holding is the creation of a per se rule for minority shareholder buyouts when the minority shareholder has a
significant management role.
In 1984, Rosen's Diversified Incorporated ("RDI") hired William McCallum ("McCallum") to serve as its CEO and executive
vice president. 78 In 1986, he was named a director. 79 As a result of
strong performance by RDI in the livestock industry, McCallum was
rewarded with a bonus of $186,815 and 12,000 shares of common
stock in the companym' In 1991, McCallum was terminated as CEO
and removed from the board of directors."' McCallum and RDI
were subsequently unable to agree on a redemption value for the
12,000 shares of common stock.82 McCallum suggested $5 Million,
while RDI suggested $600,000.83 In the subsequent litigation, RDI's
position was that the stock should be redeemed for a small premium over the value determined by the company's Employee Stock
Ownership Program ("ESOP").84 McCallum alleged that RDI's acts
were "unfairly prejudicial" toward him, thus entitling him to equitable relief in the form of a court ordered buyout.' The district
75. See id. at 703. The court specifically noted that "[t]
he Supreme Court of
Minnesota has not confronted the issue of when a minority shareholder is entitled
to a court ordered buyout" Id.
76. See Farr v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 61 F.3d 677, 679 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that where a particular state court is silent on an issue, the federal court "must
determine what that court would probably hold were it to decide the issue. In
making this determination, we may consider relevant state precedent, analogous
decisions, considered dicta, scholarly works and any other reliable data.").
77. See McCallum, 153 F.3d at 704.
78. See id. at 702.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. McCallum also owned approximately 3,300 shares of RDI common
stock purchased through the company's Employee Stock Ownership Program. See
id. at 702 n.1. Those shares were not at issue in the instant case. See id. at 703.
83. See id at 702.
84. See id.
85. Id at 703. McCallum's specific allegations were that RDI's controlling
shareholders: "(1) undermined his authority as CEO; (2) excluded him from important company decisions; (3) engaged in conduct directed at minimizing the
value of the company; (4) terminated his employment; (5) offered to redeem his
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court dismissed McCallum's buyout request on a motion for summary judgment and found that RDI had not acted in an "unfairly
prejudicial" fashion. 6
The Eighth Circuit first noted that the district court had improperly dismissed McCallum's allegations of misconduct by RDI's
board of directors.87 According to the Eighth Circuit, the district
court erred in finding that McCallum was required to observe the
derivative pleading requirements for shareholder proceedings.
Because McCallum's allegations were simply examples of unfairly
prejudicial conduct by the controlling shareholders and not separate claims on behalf of the corporation, no derivative pleading was
required.8 9 The court found support for this proposition in PJAcquisition Corp. v. Skoglund,90 where the Minnesota Supreme Court
inferred that a shareholder action for equitable relief is not a derivative action.9'
The Eighth Circuit next recognized the unique position of
closely held corporations in Minnesota.
The Minnesota legislature, sensitive to the position of minority
interests in closely held corporations, enacted legislation to protect
these interests. Minnesota Statutes section 302A.751 grants equitable authority to the courts where minority shareholder's interests
are threatened by those in control of the company.94 Specifically,
section 751 mandates the buyout of a minority shareholder's interest when "the directors or those in control of the corporation have
acted in a manner unfairly prejudicial toward one or more shareholders in their capacities as shareholders or directors. . . or as officers or employees of a closely held corporation. " The phrase
"unfairly prejudicial" in section 751, which is to be interpreted lib-

shares at an artificially low price; (6) denied him access to company books, records, and financial information; (7) engaged in self-dealing, usurped company
opportunities, and commingled personal ventures with affairs of the company."
Id.
86. Id.at 702.
87. See id. at 703.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. 453 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1990).
91. See id. at 6. See McCallum, 153 F.3d at 703.
92. See McCallum, 153 F.3d at 703.
93. See MiNN.STAT. § 302A.751, subd. I(b) (1998).
94. See MN.STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 1 (b) (3).
95. Id.
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erally, 96 is what the Eighth Circuit was referring to when it found
that the Minnesota Supreme Court had yet to confront the issue of
97
when a court ordered buyout was appropriate.
In deciding whether equitable relief was appropriate in this
case, the Eighth Circuit turned to the statutory language of section
751. The statute provides that "the reasonable expectations of the
shareholders,"98 with respect to each other and the corporation,
should be considered by the courts in deciding whether to order a
buyout.99 The court found that "reasonable expectations" often include a significant voice in the management of the company and
an opportunity to work. 100 Finally, when looking at the "reasonable
expectations" of a shareholder, the focus is on the shareholder's
expectations at the inception of the relationship with the closely
held corporation. 1° '
Applying these principles to McCallum's situation, the court
found that McCallum's "reasonable expectations" were defeated
and that RDI had acted in an unfairly prejudicial manner.102 The
Eighth Circuit focused on the fact that stock was given to McCallum
as a bonus for outstanding service and as an inducement to remain
with RDI. °1 Because the uncontested facts of the case indicated
that McCallum was removed as CEO, he was divested of his primary

96. See Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 288-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
97. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. Minnesota courts have yet to
thoroughly define "unfairly prejudicial" in the context of section 751.
98. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 3(a) (1998).
99. See McCallum v. Rosen's Diversified, Inc., 153 F.3d 701, 703 (8th Cir.
1998).
100. See id. at 704. In formulating this definition of "reasonable expectations,"
the Eighth Circuit looked to commentary by Joseph Edward Olson. See id. at 703.
Olson helped to revise the Minnesota Corporation Act and section 751. See id.
Olson has stated that section 751 is remedial in nature and "should be liberally
construed as an addition to the rights afforded non-controlling shareholders by
law and the corporation's governing documents. The broad scope of Section 751
reflects the Legislature's trust in the ability of the judiciary to achieve equitable
results on the facts appearing in individual cases." Joseph Edward Olson, Statutory
Changes Improve Position of Minority Shareholders in Closely-Held Corporations, 53
HENNEPIN LAw. 10, 11 (Sept.-Oct. 1983). The Eighth Circuit quoted the above
language in its opinion, aiding in the definition of the phrase "reasonable expectations." See McCallum, 153 F.3d at 703.
101. See McCallum, 153 F.3d at 704 ("Although the employment relationship
later deteriorated, our focus is on McCallum's reasonable expectations at the inception of the relationship."). This mode of analysis is also explicitly required by
section 751. SeeMINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 3(a).
102. See McCallum, 153 F.3d at 703-04.
103. See id. at 704.
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expectations as a minority shareholder in the corporation.
His
expectations, made all the more reasonable by his position of CEO,
were an active role in the "'management of the corporation and
input as an employee."" 5 Under the Eighth Circuit's analysis, RDI
had no choice but to defeat McCallum's "reasonable expectations."
If a CEO is also a minority shareholder, a company's choice to remove him or her will always lead to frustration of the expectation of
an active role in the management of the corporation. Thus, the
Eighth Circuit has created a per se rule mandating a court ordered
buyout where the CEO of a closely held corporation is removed
from that position and is also a minority shareholder in the com106
pany.
It must be noted that this per se rule has two possible limitations. First, in this case it is clear that McCallum did not
engage in
S 107
any type of activity designed to harm the corporation.
There
were no allegations by RDI that McCallum engaged in self-dealing
or that he usurped a corporate opportunity for his own. This type
of activity would change the analysis in that a minority shareholder
engaging in self-dealing could not successfully argue that the corporation acted unfairly prejudicial toward him. Similarly, a CEO's
.reasonable expectations" in maintaining a voice in the manage-

104. See id.
105. Id. (quoting Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)).
The Eighth Circuit used this language in Pedro to support its definition of "reasonable expectations." See id. at 704. This approach is consistent with the Eighth Circuit's mandate to follow relevant state precedent in the absence of a state supreme
court case directly confronting the issue. See Farr v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 61 F.3d
677, 679 (8th Cir. 1995).
106. See McCallum, 153 F.3d at 704. One need only look at the holding of this
case in order to see that the court has created a per se rule for CEO buyouts. The
court says that termination of a CEO "as opposed to an employee that did not have
a significant role in management-and then offering to redeem his stock, which
was used partially to lure him to remain at the company, constituted conduct toward McCallum as a shareholder sufficient to invoke the requirements of the
Minnesota Act." Id Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit noted in McCallum that its
holding was not as broad as the Minnesota Court of Appeals in a similar case. See
id. ("We need not extend our holding as far as the Minnesota Court of Appeal's,
which held that controlling shareholders that terminate the employment of a minority shareholder must make a good-faith effort to buyout the shareholder at a
fair price.") (interpreting Sawyer v. Curt & Co., Nos. C7-90-2040, C9-90-2041, 1991
WL 65320, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1991) (publication order vacated). In
reality, the Eighth Circuit holding seems broader in that a terminated CEO who is
also a minority shareholder is entitled to a court ordered buyout, not simply a good
faith effort by the majority shareholdersto buy out the shareholder at a fair price.
107. See id. at 703.
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ment of the company would be defeated where that CEO had
usurped a corporate opportunity for himself.
A second possible limitation is the Eighth Circuit's repeated
reference to McCallum's stock. The court notes on three occasions
that the stock was given to McCallum "as compensation for his outstanding service and as an inducement to remain at RDI, in order
to foster its continued growth." °8 Given the court's repeated reliance on this fact in formulating McCallum's "reasonable expectations," it is possible that a minority shareholder who had received
stock in a closely held corporation prior to being named CEO would
not be subject to the same per se rule as was McCallum in this case.
C. Demand Required v. Demand Excused

In Reimel v. MacFarlane,1 9 a federal district court applying Minnesota law attempted to clarify the parameters of demand futility110
with regard to Minnesota corporations.
The court began by noting that the Minnesota Supreme Court has not visited the issue of
112
demand futility since 1961, and numerous questions still exist regarding when demand is required or excused in Minnesota." 3
These unresolved questions led to the result in Reimel, where the
court found demand required if the board of directors may have
acted in good faith. 1 4 While this finding is consistent with the intentions behind requiring demand on the board, it exposes an am108. Id.
109. 9 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (D. Minn. 1998).
110. See id. at 1065. The court noted the derivative pleading requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, which requires that "in a derivative action brought by a shareholder to enforce a right of a corporation, the complaint
allege with particularity 'the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and... the reasons for plaintiffs failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.'" Id.
(quoting FED. R. Crv. P. 23.1).
111. See id.
112. See id. (citing Winter v. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union, 259 Minn. 257,
107 N.W.2d 226 (1961)).
113. See id. In Minnesota and many other jurisdictions, demand is excused if it
would be futile. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814-17 (Del. 1984) (excusing demand as futile where factual allegations create a reasonable doubt that
either: (1) the majority of the corporation's board was disinterested in the transaction or independent; or (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the result of
a valid exercise of business judgment); Winter, 259 Minn. at 267, 107 N.W.2d at
233-34 (finding demand futile where the alleged wrongdoers constitute a majority
of the board).
114. SeeReime4 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1066-67.
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biguity in Minnesota precedent and thus indicates why the subject
of demand futility should again be addressed by the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Patricia Reimel ("Reimel") was a shareholder in Otter Tail
Power ("Otter Tail"), a Minnesota corporation. 5 On January 27,
1997, Otter Tail adopted a shareholder rights plan that was designed to protect it against hostile takeovers.
The plan created a
new class of securities." 7 These new securities contained a "flip in"
provision, entitling each holder of a right to buy $140 worth of
stock for $70 upon a triggering event relating to the acquisition of
fifteen percent or more of common stock.
The securities also
contained a "flip over" feature, providing that a shareholder may
buy $100 worth of an acquiring company's shares for $50."9 Neither provision, each known as a "poison pill,' 2 0 applied if an offer
for all Otter Tail shares was approved by a majority of the company's non-officer directors. 21 Finally, the plan had a "dead hand"
feature providing that "flip in" and "flip over" rights could only be
redeemed by a majority of the continuing directors on conditions
established by them. 122 Reimel alleged that this "dead hand" feature was enacted to "entrench" the board and make future contests
for corporate
control "prohibitively expensive and effectively im• ,,123
possible.
Alternatively, Otter Tail contended that this plan was
115. See id. at 1064.
116. See id.
117. See id. The new class of securities was called "preferred share purchase
rights." Id. "The rights were declared and became payable as a dividend, one
right per share for each of the outstanding common shares of the company on the
record date of February 7, 1997." Id.
118. See id. This provision was alleged by Otter Tail to prevent the acquisitions
of the company by outside interests. See id. As the court in Reimel noted, "[t]his
provision deters would be acquirers of Otter Tail by threatening to dilute their
holdings and greatly increase the number of shares an acquirer would have to
purchase in order consummate a merger, combination, or takeover purchase." Id.
119. See id. This "flip over" feature would apply in the event of a hostile takeover or merger. See id. As the court in Reimel noted, "[t]his feature subjects the
acquiring company to a half price sale of its own stock and thereby dilutes the interest of its other shareholders, obviously deterring potential acquisitions." Id.
120. See generally Robert A. Helman &JamesJ. Junewicz, A Fresh Look at Poison
Pills, 42 Bus. LAW. 771, 772-74 (1987) (reciting a brief history of "poison pills").
121. See Reimel, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1064.
122. See id.
123. Id. In analyzing the plaintiff's approach, the court acknowledged that the
"dead hand" provision "entrenches the incumbent board by preventing the shareholders-who never approved the Rights-from receiving any offer to purchase
their shares without the prior approval of the Continuing Directors." Id.
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put in place to prevent a hostile takeover of the company.124
As no demand was made on the board before initiating the action, the court's analysis focused on whether allegations of a board
entrenching itself were sufficient to make demand futile, and thus
excused, according to Minnesota law.
Applying the applicable
Minnesota law, the court focused on the Minnesota Supreme26
Court's holding in Winter v. FarmersEducation & Cooperative Union.
In Winter, the Minnesota Supreme Court announced that "demand
is not required where it is plain from the circumstances that it
would be futile.'12 The Reimel court noted that there have been no
recent Minnesota decisions applying the Winter principle in the
context of pre-suit demand on the board. '8 The court also announced that no Minnesota case has held that Delaware's approach
to demand futility should be followed in Minnesota, even though
Minnesota courts have followed Delaware corporate law in other
contexts.)
Thus, without recent guidance from Minnesota case
law, the court was forced to interpret Winter in the context of Reimel's failure to make a demand on Otter Tail's board.
The court found.that Winter's predominant message was that a
"shareholder derivative suit is a last resort, available only where-as
in that case-there is no possibility that the board will consider the
merits of the demand.' 30 Demand on the board provides it with an
opportunity to consider the claim and resolve the dispute without
resorting to litigation .'
124.

See id.

125. See id. at 1065. The court noted that at least one Delaware court has
found demand excused where there were allegations of directors' perpetuating
themselves in office. See id. (citing In re Chrysler Corp. Shareholders Litig., No.
11873, 1992 WL 181024, at *4-*5 (Del. Ch. July 27, 1992)).
126. See id. (analyzing Winter v. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union, 259 Minn. 257,
107 N.W.2d 226 (1961)).
127. Winter, 259 Minn. at 267, 107 N.W.2d at 234 (citations omitted).
128. See Reimel 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1066.
129. See id.
130. Id. The court pointed to the following language in Winter to support its
interpretation: "The derivative suit is recognized as an extraordinary remedy available only where there is 'no other road to redress.'" Id. (quoting Winter, 259
Minn. at 267, 107 N.W.2d at 233).
131. See id. This policy discussion was included by the Winter court as well. See
Winter, 259 Minn. at 267, 107 N.W.2d at 233. The Minnesota Supreme Court
found that "demand upon managing directors and shareholders is important in
that it gives the management of the corporation an opportunity to consider the
merits of the dispute and determine, in the interests of the corporation and
shareholders, whether it might be disposed of without the expense and delay of
litigation." Id.
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Applying these principles to the Reimrel situation, the court
found that demand was not futile." 2 Because there were no allegations that Otter Tail's board engaged in self-dealing or converted
corporate funds, the court found that demand was required on the
board. 3 Where there are no allegations of "patently egregious
board conduct," and where there is a possibility that the board
acted in good faith, the court found that demand must be made on
the board.134 According to the court, this analysis applies even
where the alleged wrongdoers constitute a majority of the board." 5
While this approach has valid policy ramifications in that it discourages litigation, the language in Winter creates uncertainty for
courts deciding whether demand on the board is futile.
In Winter, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that,
"[o] rdinarily a demand should be made on the board of directors
unless the wrongdoers constitute a majority of the board .... "6
This language indicates a per se approach to demand futility
where, as is the case with Reimel, the alleged wrongdoers constitute
a majority of the board.1i ' Although the Reimel court ultimately rejected the approach,13 8 the language in Winter is clear and should
not be ignored by courts seeking to follow Minnesota precedent.
The Reimel decision, decided in 1998 by a federal district court applying Minnesota law, is indicative of the confusion surrounding
Winter's 1961 formulation of demand futility.'3 9 Thus, to alleviate
confusion surrounding demand futility, the Minnesota Supreme
Court should revisit the issue at its first opportunity.

Charles B. Von Feldt

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See Reime4 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1066-67.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1066.
Winter, 259 Minn. at 266-67, 107 N.W.2d at 233.
See id.
See Reime 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1066.
See id.
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